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Abstract 
 
In Ireland, Article 40.3.3° of Bunreacht na hÉireann (the Irish Constitution) 
guarantees the right to life of the unborn child and the equal right to life of the mother.  
Abortion in Ireland is permissible only where there is a real and substantial risk to the 
mother‟s own life.  Since Ireland became a signatory to the European Convention on 
Human Rights in 1950,
2
 there have been concerns that it could result in Ireland being 
compelled to introduce a right to abortion.
3
  This article commences with a review of 
the extant law on abortion in Ireland, tracing the Constitutional protection afforded to 
the unborn child. The article will discuss the impact of the European Court of Human 
Rights‟4 jurisprudence in regard to access to abortion and to information on abortion 
services in Ireland in an effort to ascertain if it really has resulted in a radical change 
to Irish abortion laws. As such, it will also be necessary to examine the more recent 
decisions of the ECtHR such as Tysiac v. Poland,
5
 and A, B, and C v. Ireland,
6
 to 
determine both the approach of the ECtHR to access to abortion in general and also to 
consider if it has resulted in a liberalisation of abortion law in Ireland. 
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1. Tracing the Development of Ireland’s Abortion Laws 
 
A statutory prohibition on abortion has been in existence in Ireland since 1861.  
Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Person Act of 1861 introduced the 
prohibition on abortion and the provision of abortion services.
7
  Section 58 renders it 
a criminal offence for any woman who tries to procure an abortion.
8
  Any person 
                                                 
1
 The author wishes to thank the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Research Travel 
Programme Scheme, Dublin City University for funding travel to present a paper at the 18
th
 World 
Congress on Medical Law, University of Zagreb, Croatia, on which this article is based. 
2
 The European Convention on Human Rights will hereinafter be referred to as ECHR. 
3
 S. Colt, “A, B & C v. Ireland: “Europe‟s Roe v. Wade”?”, Lewis & Clark Law Review, 14(3) (2010) 
1189-1232; J. Spreng, Abortion and Divorce Law in Ireland. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company 
Inc, 2004) p. 84. 
4
 The European Court of Human Rights will hereinafter be referred to as ECtHR. 
5
 Tysiąc v. Poland, Application No. 5410/03, 20 March 2007, European Court of Human Rights 
(Fourth Section). 
6
 A, B, C v. Ireland, Application No. 25579/05, European Court of Human Rights, 16 December 2010, 
paragraph 3. 
7
 For further information see also, Department of the Taoiseach (1999) Green Paper on Abortion. 
Available at http://www.taoiseach.ie/attached_files/Pdf%20files/GreenPaperOnAbortion.pdf  
8
 Section 58 provides that: “Every woman, being with child, who, with intent to procure her own 
miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to herself any poison or other noxious thing or shall 
Revised manuscript
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providing assistance with the procurement of an abortion will also be committing a 
criminal offence under section 59: 
 
Whoever shall unlawfully supply or procure any poison or other noxious 
thing, or any instrument or thing whatsoever, knowing that the same is 
intended to be unlawfully used or employed with intent to procure the 
miscarriage of any woman, whether she be or be not with child, shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanour… 
 
Subsequent legislation has affirmed the protection of the unborn child,
9
 and 
endorsed the statutory prohibitions on abortion contained in sections 58 and 59 of the 
Offences against the Person Act, 1861.
10
   
 
 
2. Constitutional Developments Concerning Abortion in Ireland 
 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, there were concerns that women in Ireland would 
seek changes to the law permitting abortion; particularly as such changes were 
coming into place in other jurisdictions. For example, the United Kingdom enacted 
the Abortion Act in 1967 permitting abortion in circumstances where two doctors 
deem it necessary to save the life of a pregnant woman, to prevent harm to the 
woman‟s physical and mental health, and also where there exists a substantial risk that 
the baby would be born with severe physical or mental abnormalities.  Moreover, 
fears emerged after the Irish Supreme Court‟s decision in McGee v. Attorney 
General,
11
 that a right to abortion could be asserted under the Constitution, as there 
were no specific provisions in the Constitution at this time protecting the right to life 
of the unborn child.
12
 
McGee v. Attorney General
13
 concerned the use of contraceptives by a married 
couple. At this time, the importation of contraceptives was banned in Ireland. The 
plaintiff was a married mother of four children, who had been advised by her medical 
doctor not to become pregnant again.  To prevent a further pregnancy she tried to 
import a spermicidal jelly into Ireland. However, customs officers seized this item as 
the importation of contraceptives was prohibited under section 42 of the Customs 
Consolidation Act 1876, as amended by section 17 (3) of the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 1935.  Section 17 (3) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1935 
prohibited the importation or attempt to import any contraceptive products.
14
  Mrs 
McGee claimed that she had a right to marital privacy under Article 40.3.1° of the 
Constitution and that the legislative prohibition on the importation of contraceptives 
                                                                                                                                            
unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, and whosoever, with 
intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether she be or not be with child, shall unlawfully 
administer to her or cause to be taken by her any poison or other noxious thing, or shall unlawfully use 
any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, shall be guilty of a felony, and being 
convicted thereof shall be liable to be kept in penal servitude for life.” 
9
 Section 58, Civil Liability Act 1961. 
10
 Section 10, Health (Family Planning) Act 1979. 
11
 McGee v. Attorney General [1974] IR 284.  
12
 G. Hogan and G. Whyte, J M Kelly: The Irish Constitution. (Dublin: Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 
2004), p. 1495. 
13
 Supra note 11. 
14
 This section also rendered it illegal to sell, or expose, offer, advertise or keep for sale, any 
contraceptive items. 
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was in violation of this right.  The High Court rejected her claim and she appealed to 
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that Article 40.3.1° guaranteed a right to 
privacy in marital relations, and that this included a right to use contraceptives, 
therefore the prohibition contained under section 17(3) was in violation of the 
Constitutional guarantee.
15
   
Given the developments at this time in the United States regarding its 
Constitution and the liberalisation of the laws governing abortion, whereby the courts 
in the United States had interpreted the right to marital privacy to also contain a 
woman‟s right to decide whether to have an abortion,16 there were serious concerns 
that a consequence of the Supreme Court decision in McGee v. Attorney General 
would be an extension of the Constitutional right to marital privacy and the use of 
contraceptives, to permit a right to abortion in Ireland.  Furthermore, it was feared that 
the Constitution did not provide sufficient protection of the right to life of the unborn 
child.
17
 Efforts were subsequently made to ensure that the Constitution was amended 
to safeguard the right to life of the unborn child.
18
  A referendum was held in 1983, 
resulting in the Eighth Constitutional amendment, which inserted a new provision, 
Article 40.3.3° of Bunreacht na hÉireann, guaranteeing the right to life of the unborn 
child and the equal right to life of the mother.
19
 
Interpretation of the scope of this amendment resulted in litigation before the 
Irish and European courts,
20
 specifically concerning whether the provision of 
information regarding abortion and lawful abortion services in other jurisdictions was 
permissible as a consequence of the amendment.    
One of the first cases concerning the interpretation of the Eighth 
Constitutional Amendment was Attorney General (SPUC (Ireland) Ltd.) v. Open 
Door Counselling Ltd,
 21
 which culminated in the defendants taking their case to the 
ECtHR arguing that there had been a violation of their rights under the ECHR. The 
Attorney General (SPUC (Ireland) Ltd.) v. Open Door Counselling case was initiated 
by the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child, who were seeking a declaration 
that the activities of the Open Door Counselling and Well Woman Centre, namely 
counselling services for pregnant women which included the provision of information 
about abortion and abortion services available in other jurisdictions, were unlawful.  
In addition, the plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent the defendants from 
continuing to provide such services.  A High Court order was granted, which was 
subsequently appealed by the defendants.  However, the Supreme Court rejected the 
                                                 
15
 For further analysis of this case, see J. Casey, Constitutional Law in Ireland, (Dublin: Round Hall 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) p. 397. 
16
 Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 381 US 479 and Roe v. Wade (1973) 410 US 113.  G. Hogan and G. 
Whyte, J M Kelly: The Irish Constitution. (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, Dublin, 2004), pp. 1497-1498. 
17
 S. Drislane, “Abortion and the Medical Profession in Ireland”, Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland, 
15(1) (2009) 35. 
18
 A, B, C v. Ireland, Application No. 25579/05, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, 16 
December 2010, paragraph 35; B. Mercurio, “Abortion in Ireland: An Analysis of the Legal 
Transformation Resulting from Membership in the European Union”, Tulane Journal of International 
and Comparative Law, 11 (2003) 141-180 at p.144-146; Casey, supra note 15 at p. 434; Spreng, supra 
note 3 at p. 1193. 
19
 As a result of this referendum, Article 40.3.3° thus provided that: “The State acknowledges the right 
to life of the unborn and, with due regard for the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws 
to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right.” 
20
 Attorney General (SPUC (Ireland) Ltd.) v. Open Door Counselling Ltd. [1988] IR 593; Society for 
the Protection of the Unborn Child  (Ireland) Ltd (SPUC) v. Grogan and Others [1989] IR 753; Open 
Door and Wellwoman v. Ireland (1992) 15 EHRR 244. 
21
 Attorney General (SPUC (Ireland) Ltd.) v. Open Door Counselling Ltd. [1988] IR 593. 
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defendant‟s argument that there was also an implied and unenumerated constitutional 
right to disseminate information about abortion services lawfully available in other 
jurisdictions. The Supreme Court held that: “…no right could constitutionally arise to 
obtain information the purpose of the obtaining of which was to defeat the 
constitutional right to life of the unborn child”.22 
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court decision and granted an injunction 
to „perpetually‟ restrain the defendants from providing any services or information 
that would enable pregnant women to travel to another jurisdiction for the 
procurement of an abortion, including “…the making for them of travel arrangements, 
or by informing them of the identity and location of and method of communication 
with a specified clinic or clinics…”23 
In light of the prohibitive decision of the Supreme Court, the defendants 
brought their case before the European Commission of Human Rights asserting that 
there had been a violation of their rights under the ECHR.
24
  
 
2.1. Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland
25
 
 
The case was initially heard by the European Commission of Human Rights, which 
decided the case only in relation to Article 10 and the right to freedom of expression. 
The European Commission of Human Rights determined that the Supreme Court‟s 
perpetual injunction preventing the applicants from providing counselling services 
and assistance to pregnant women seeking abortions elsewhere was in violation of 
Article 10.
26
  The case was then referred to the ECtHR. The decision of the ECtHR in 
Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland provides a useful insight into the role 
of the ECHR in respect of influencing and altering the law in Ireland regarding 
abortion, specifically the right to provide information about lawful abortion services 
elsewhere.   
The applicants, Open Door and Dublin Well Woman, claimed that the 
decision of the Supreme Court constituted discrimination that was contrary to the 
provisions of Articles 10 and 14 of the ECHR. They complained that the injunction 
was „an unjustified interference‟27 with their rights under Article 10 of the ECHR, 
which enshrines the right to freedom of expression, and also includes the:“…freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference 
by public authority and regardless of frontiers…” 
The ECtHR deemed the application to be admissible despite the fact that the 
applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies, simply because the ECtHR 
acknowledged that the applicants had little prospect of success before the domestic 
courts.
28
 While not advocating any radical changes to women‟s right to abortion in 
                                                 
22
 Ibid. per Finlay, C.J. at 626. 
23
 Ibid. at 627. The Supreme Court did vary the terms of the injunction granted from that issued by the 
High Court. 
24
 Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, Application No.14234/88 and 14235/88, Court 
(Plenary), 29
th
 October 1992. Both defendants initially lodged their complaint before the European 
Commission of Human Rights on 10 August 1988 (Open Door Counselling Ltd) and 15 September 
1988 (Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd).  The case was then referred to the European Court of Human 
Rights by the European Commission of Human Rights on 24 April 1991 and by the Government of 
Ireland on 3 July 1991. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland [1991] 14 EHRRep 131. 
27
 Ibid. at paragraph 36. 
28
 Ibid. at paragraphs 48, and 50-51. 
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Ireland, this ECtHR judgment did enhance the development of human rights, 
specifically those rights related to accessing information.
29
  The ECtHR ruled that the 
injunction issued by the Supreme Court preventing the applicants from providing 
information about abortion and abortion services was „overbroad and 
disproportionate‟,30 especially in light of the Supreme Court ruling in the Attorney 
General v. X,
31
 which permitted women to have an abortion where there is a real and 
substantial risk to the mother‟s life.  The injunction issued by the Supreme Court 
preventing the applicants from providing counselling and disseminating information 
about abortion services was deemed to be indefensible by the majority of the ECtHR 
on the grounds that these women, who could lawfully have an abortion, would be 
entitled to receive information about abortion services.   
Furthermore, the ECtHR found that Open Door Counselling Ltd and Dublin 
Well Woman Centre, provided a counselling service and did not actively promote or 
endorse abortion to those using the service.  Thus, the ECtHR recognised that there 
were women who would have decided not to have an abortion as a consequence of the 
counselling services provided, and provision of information about abortion did not 
necessarily equate with an increase in demand for abortion services.
32
  Also, the 
ECtHR took into account the fact that women could seek information about abortion 
services in other jurisdictions through their own personal contacts, as well as in other 
sources such as telephone directories and magazines in Ireland, therefore rendering 
the injunction ineffective as women continued to travel to the United Kingdom to 
have an abortion.
33
  The injunction served to have a negative impact on the health of 
those women who sought to have an abortion at later stages of their pregnancy 
because they were unable to access counselling or information, and women who had 
travelled to have an abortion, did not seek necessary medical care due to the lack of 
information.
34
  For these reasons, the ECtHR concluded that the injunction was 
„disproportionate to the aims pursued‟ and that it was in violation of Article 10.35 
Consequently, this ruling resulted in the enactment of legislation to regulate the 
provision of information about lawful abortion services outside Ireland, namely the 
Regulation of Information (Services outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) 
Act 1995.  
While this decision resulted in a small change to Irish law, it did not address 
the more sensitive issue of whether a right to an abortion does in fact exist under the 
ECHR.  Nor did it result in any change to the Constitutional position on abortion or 
the right to life of the unborn child in Ireland.  The ECtHR quite deliberately avoided 
the question of whether the Convention does contain a right to abortion, or whether 
the foetus has a right to life under Article 2. Admittedly it was not required to do so 
by virtue of the complaint submitted by the applicants, which concerned only whether 
the injunction was in violation of the ECHR.
36
  Unsurprisingly, the ECtHR confirmed 
that states have a „wide margin of appreciation‟ on moral issues, such as the nature of 
                                                 
29
 M. Hartlev, “Diversity and Harmonisation. Trends and Challenges in European Health Law”, 
European Journal of Health Law, 17(1) (2010) 37-50 at 48. 
30
 Supra note 24 at paragraph 74. 
31
 Attorney General v. X [1992] ILRM 401. 
32
 Supra note 24 at, paragraph 75. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Ibid. at paragraph 77. 
35
 Ibid. at paragraph 80. 
36
 Ibid. at paragraph 66. 
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human life, because there is a lack of consensus among the Contracting States to the 
ECHR on this matter.
37
 
 
2.2. Attorney General v. X
38
 
 
In the interim period prior to the ECtHR ruling in the Open Door case, the Supreme 
Court in the case of Attorney General v. X, issued a seminal judgment concerning the 
interpretation of the Eighth Constitution Amendment, which arguably had a much 
more profound impact on the development of the Irish Constitutional position 
concerning abortion, and also access to information about abortion services, than the 
ECtHR judgment in Open Door. 
X, was a 14 year old girl who became pregnant after she had allegedly been 
raped by her best friend‟s father.  Because of Ireland‟s Constitutional protection of the 
unborn child, X could not lawfully procure an abortion, therefore her parents arranged 
for her to travel to England for the purposes of having an abortion as X had threatened 
to commit suicide if she was forced to continue with the pregnancy.  Her parents 
contacted An Garda Siochana (the Irish police) notifying them of their intentions to 
travel to England for an abortion because they wanted to know if the police could 
carry out DNA tests on the foetal tissue to identify the alleged rapist. The Irish police 
notified the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) concerning this request to use the 
foetal tissue as DNA evidence to identify the alleged rapist and also if it would be 
admissible as evidence in any subsequent criminal proceedings. On 5
th
 February 1992, 
X‟s parents were informed that the foetal evidence would not be deemed admissible in 
court.  X and her parents travelled to England on 6
th
 February as the arrangements had 
been made for her to have the abortion.  Given the Constitutional protection of the 
right to life of the unborn child (and at this time, there was no provision in the 
Constitution permitting abortion on the grounds of the mother‟s life being at risk of 
suicide), and because it was also unclear after the 1983 Constitutional amendments 
whether women could legally travel to another jurisdiction for abortion services, the 
DPP notified the Attorney General. 
In order to ensure that X did not procure an abortion, thus terminating the 
pregnancy, an interim injunction was sought by the Attorney General in the Irish High 
Court. It was made clear that the arrangement for the abortion would go ahead if the 
injunction was not granted, so the High Court granted the injunction.  At this point, X 
had already travelled to England with her parents. However, they decided to cancel 
the arrangement for the abortion and returned to Ireland to contest the injunction 
claiming that they had a right to travel to another jurisdiction where abortion was 
legal, and where the mother‟s own life was at risk.  This appeal was submitted to the 
Supreme Court.   
While declaring that it has a constitutional obligation to defend and vindicate 
the right to life of the unborn, the Supreme Court deemed the appeal against the High 
Court injunction to be admissible in the circumstances as X threatened to commit 
suicide if she had to continue with the pregnancy, therefore her own right to life was 
at risk.
 39
 The Supreme Court then had to determine the balance between the right to 
life of the unborn child and the equal right to life of the mother as guaranteed under 
Article 40.3.3° of the Constitution, in deciding whether to allow X to have an 
abortion.  The Supreme Court ruled that abortion may be permissible:  
                                                 
37
 Supra note 24 at paragraph 68. 
38
 Attorney General v. X [1992] IR 1. 
39
 Ibid. at paragraph 55. 
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…if it is established as a matter of probability that there is a real and 
substantial risk to the life as distinct from the health of the mother which can 
only be avoided by the termination of her pregnancy, such termination is 
permissible, having regard to the true interpretation… of the Constitution.40 
 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that the risk to the mother‟s life 
includes the risk of suicide.  What is also notable about this judgment is that the 
Supreme Court was adamant that the Constitutional guarantee under Article 40.3.3° 
does not extend to allow abortion if there is a risk only to the mother‟s health and not 
her life.  The judgment failed to take into account that in certain cases the mother‟s 
health and life are intrinsically linked.  
 
 
3. Consequences of Attorney General v. X and the Right to Access Abortion 
Services 
 
An immediate consequence of the Supreme Court ruling in Attorney General v. X was 
a constitutional referendum, held in 1992 on three issues specifically dealing with the 
outcome of this judgment.  The People of Ireland were asked to decide on three 
possible amendments to the Constitution in respect of women‟s right to lawfully 
access abortion services.  The first proposed amendment called for an amendment to 
the Constitution to permit abortion where there exists a real and substantial risk to the 
mother‟s life, excluding the risk of suicide.  Effectively this was a much more 
draconian approach to women‟s right to access abortion services than was permitted 
by the Supreme Court in the Attorney General v. X. The electorate rejected the first 
proposed amendment. 
As noted in the Attorney General v. X, it was unclear from the Constitution at 
the time whether women had a right to travel to another State to access lawful 
abortion services. Therefore, the 1992 referendum contained a second proposed 
Constitutional amendment to allow women the right to travel to another State to have 
a lawful abortion.  This proposed amendment was approved, becoming the Thirteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution.  Approval was also given to a third proposal on the 
right to provide information about abortion services lawfully available in a different 
State. This was the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, adding to Article 
40.3.3°.
41
   
Even though Article 40.3.3° does imply that legislation would be enacted to 
regulate access to abortion,
42
 such legislative guidelines have not been put in place to 
date, and as such there are no legal definitions of what „a real and substantial risk to 
the mother‟s life‟ is.  As such, it is unclear when lawful abortions are permissible, and 
is therefore very confusing for those women seeking to have an abortion. It is also 
extremely problematic for medical practitioners who may be asked to carry out such 
                                                 
40
 Per Chief Justice Finlay. Ibid. at paragraphs 53-54. 
41
 Article 40.3.3° now provides the following Constitutional guarantees:“The State acknowledges the 
right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its 
laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right. This subsection 
shall not limit freedom to travel between the State and another state. This subsection shall not limit 
freedom to obtain or make available, in the State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by 
law, information relating to services lawfully available in another state.” 
42
 Supra note 24, at paragraph 66. 
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abortions as there is no procedural framework in place to determine access to lawful 
abortions.  
At no time have there been any suggestions that the scope of Irish abortion law 
should be extended to permit abortion for health and well-being reasons, or for that 
matter on socio-economic grounds. In fact, the Supreme Court in the Attorney 
General v. X stressed that allowing abortion to save the mother‟s life under the 
Constitution does not also include a right to abortion to protect her health.
43
 Similarly 
in Baby O v. Minister for Justice,
44
 the Supreme Court emphasised that abortion is 
permissible only when it is necessary to save the mother‟s life, and that Article 
40.3.3° of the Constitution does not permit the legalisation of abortion either by 
legislation or judicial decision within the State. Since 1992, the Constitutional 
referendum seeking to amend the Constitutional right to abortion have taken a more 
restrictive approach and have tried to narrow the grounds whereby abortion is 
permissible. Efforts since the Attorney General v. X case to provide clarification as to 
what constitutes „a real and substantial risk‟ to the mother‟s life through legislative 
guidelines was defeated in the 2002 referendum.
45
 The 2002 referendum also 
contained proposals to restrict the scope of Article 40.3.3° by prohibiting abortion 
where the mother threatens to commit suicide. Proposals were put forward to 
introduce draft legislation, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment of the Constitution 
(Protection of Human Life in Pregnancy) Bill, 2001, to regulate abortion, which 
included the introduction of a 12-year penalty for women who terminate their 
pregnancy in Ireland.
46
  These proposals were ultimately rejected.   
 
 
4. ECHR in Ireland – European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 
 
Ireland was one of the first signatories of the ECHR in 1950, becoming a State party 
upon ratification of the ECHR in February 1953.  However, because Ireland has a 
dualist system, the ECHR was not binding on domestic Irish law prior to the 
European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003, albeit that Ireland was bound by 
the ECHR under international law before this. There is evidence within some of the 
Irish jurisprudence pre-2003 to indicate that the ECHR did have some persuasive 
value in domestic cases.
47
  
The enactment of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, 
which incorporates the ECHR into domestic Irish law,
48
 means that it is now 
enforceable before domestic courts.  Arguably this could result in an extension of the 
existing right to abortion where the mother‟s life is at risk to include circumstances 
where her health is also at risk should the pregnancy continue.  However, the fact that 
the ECHR is sub-constitutional would render it difficult for any such change to be 
made, as the ECHR is effectively subject to the supremacy of the Constitution.
49
 
                                                 
43
 Supra note 38. 
44
 Baby O v. Minister for Justice [2002] 2 IR 169. 
45
 This was the third referendum on abortion and 25
th
 Constitutional referendum 
46
 B. Daly (2005) “Wrongful Birth, Wrongful Conception and the Irish Constitution”, European 
Journal of Health Law 12(1) (2005) 57-76 at p. 57. 
47
 For further discussion of the dualist relationship between Ireland and the ECHR see, B. Moriarty and 
A.M. Mooney Cotter (eds.), Law Society of Ireland -Human Rights Law. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), pp. 2-6. 
48
 Ireland is a dualist system, which means that the ECHR has to be statutorily incorporated into 
domestic legislation. 
49
 Moriarty and Mooney Cotter, supra note 47, pp. 2-6. 
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Thus, amendments to the Irish Constitution can only be made by a Constitutional 
referendum.
50
  If there are questions as to whether Irish law is compatible with the 
Convention, the Supreme Court has declared that it must first be decided if the law is 
in fact constitutional.
51
 It is accepted that the ECHR is an important influence on the 
development of health and human rights,
52
 and since 2003 Irish courts do have an 
obligation to take ECtHR jurisprudence into consideration in respect of cases that 
concern provisions of the ECHR.
53
 So what must now be considered is how 
influential, if at all, this jurisprudence has been on Irish abortion law. 
 
 
5. ECtHR Jurisprudence on the Right to a Legal Abortion 
 
The European Commission of Human Rights, and more recently the ECtHR,
54
 have 
dealt with a number of cases specifically dealing with the issue of the right to life of 
the unborn child and a right to an abortion under Articles 2, 6, 8, 10, 13 and 14 of the 
ECHR, namely Bruggemann and Scheuten v. Germany,
55
 X v. United Kingdom,
56
 H 
v. Norway,
57
 Open Door & Well Woman v. Ireland,
58
 Boso v. Italy,
59
 Vo v. France,
60
 
D v. Ireland,
61
  Tysiąc v. Poland,62 and most recently, A, B, C v. Ireland.63  What is 
notable about some of these cases is that the complaints were not submitted by 
women who were pregnant and who had been prevented from procuring a lawful 
abortion.
64
 Some complaints were brought by men claiming breach of Convention 
because they had no rights concerning their partner‟s decision to have an abortion.65  
While Vo v. France did not specifically concern a right to abortion, it was the first 
occasion that the ECtHR was faced with the question of whether an unborn foetus had 
                                                 
50
 For further discussion of the role of the ECHR in Ireland refer to F. DeLondras and C. Kelly, 
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a right to life under Article 2 of the ECHR.
66
  As with earlier decisions, the ECtHR 
declined to deal with the question of when life begins because there is no agreement 
among States as to when life begins, therefore leaving the margin of appreciation to 
States.
67
 
Two cases have been brought against Ireland regarding the applicant‟s right of 
access to a legal abortion since the introduction of the European Convention on 
Human Rights Act 2003.
68
 The first case, D v. Ireland
69
 concerned a complaint about 
the ban on access to abortion services in Ireland. D already had two children and was 
pregnant with twins. Following an amniocentesis test and ultrasound scan, she was 
informed that one of the twins had stopped developing at 8 weeks gestation.  She was 
also informed that the other twin had a severe chromosomal abnormality (Trisomy 18 
or Edward‟s Syndrome) and would most likely die because it is a lethal genetic 
condition with very slim prospects of survival.
70
 D made arrangements to travel to 
England for an abortion because she felt physically and mentally unable to cope with 
continuing the pregnancy given that one twin had already died in the womb and the 
second twin had little prospect of survival if the pregnancy went to full-term.  Her 
doctors acknowledged that she would not be deemed eligible to have an abortion in 
Ireland in the circumstances because her own life was not a risk (and this is the only 
grounds upon which an abortion is permissible in Ireland).
71
 She had not initiated any 
legal proceedings regarding her right of access to an abortion in Ireland prior to this. 
The ECtHR deemed her case to be inadmissible because she had failed to exhaust 
available domestic remedies to determine whether abortion would be available in the 
case of „fatal foetal abnormality‟.72 Furthermore, the ECtHR stated that „an aggrieved 
individual‟ should test the constitutional protection of rights before the domestic 
courts to allow the domestic courts an opportunity to extend those rights.
73
 It seems 
somewhat odd that the ECtHR should come to the conclusion that D‟s case was 
inadmissible and insist that she ought to have taken her action before the Irish court 
given its earlier judgment that deemed the Open Door and Well Woman v. Ireland 
case to be admissible because the ECtHR held that the applicants would be unlikely to 
be successful before the Irish courts.  This case was a missed opportunity for the 
ECtHR to tackle the right to access lawful abortions in Ireland for grounds other than 
where there was a real and substantial risk to the mother‟s life.  Perhaps this should be 
taken to indicate an underlying reluctance of the ECtHR to interfere with a State‟s 
margin of appreciation in respect of the right to life of the unborn child and the right 
to abortion.    
Certainly there is evidence to demonstrate that the ECtHR will not recommend 
any changes to existing laws on abortion and the right to access abortion services 
within signatory States.  What is clear though is that where a State does provide for a 
right to abortion and to access abortion services, the ECtHR will uphold such rights.  
In Tysiąc v. Poland, 74 the ECtHR held that a State will have a positive obligation to 
uphold such rights under the ECHR.  In this case, the applicant, who had severe 
myopia, was worried about the potential impact that her third pregnancy could have 
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on her health, because her earlier pregnancies had already led to the deterioration of 
her eyesight.  She was particularly concerned about the threat posed to her eyesight 
should she continue with her third pregnancy. Tysiąc consulted three 
ophthalmologists who all agreed that there was a serious risk to her eyesight should 
the pregnancy go to term.  However, despite the potential exposure to this risk, none 
of the consultants were willing to issue a certificate for a therapeutic abortion. She 
then consulted a general practitioner who did issue her with a certificate for a 
therapeutic abortion because of the risks posed to her eyesight by continuing with her 
third pregnancy due to her underlying condition.  Abortion is allowed in Poland where 
pregnancy poses a threat to the woman‟s life or health.  However, two non-treating 
independent doctors have to approve such abortions.  Unfortunately for the applicant 
in this case, the two independent non-treating doctors in the hospital where she sought 
to have the abortion concluded that there were no medical grounds to justify a 
therapeutic abortion in her case.  At the time, there was no procedural framework in 
place to regulate this decision-making process, and neither was there any mechanism 
to facilitate appeals by patients of the doctors‟ decision.75  Thus, the applicant had no 
choice but to continue with her pregnancy and she gave birth to her third child by 
caesarean section in November 2000.  Subsequent to the birth, the applicant suffered a 
retinal haemorrhage, which caused her to be significantly disabled.  Tysiąc submitted 
her complaint before the ECtHR arguing that she did satisfy the statutory 
requirements for a therapeutic abortion, and that the refusal to perform the abortion 
was in violation of her rights under Articles 3, 8, 13 and 14 ECHR.   
In this instance, the ECtHR somewhat predictably declined to consider 
whether a right to abortion is guaranteed under the Convention (as abortion is 
permissible in Poland where there is a risk to the mother‟s life or health). Neither did 
it engage in discussion concerning when life begins, nor if the scope of Article 2 
extends to include the unborn foetus. Instead, the ECtHR investigated the positive 
obligation of the State to „secure the physical integrity of mothers-to-be‟.76  The 
ECtHR did not find a breach of Article 3, and deemed it more appropriate to consider 
Tysiąc‟s complaint under Article 8 on the grounds that pregnancy is linked to a 
woman‟s private life.  The ECtHR was conscious that doctors were very often 
dissuaded from „authorising an abortion‟ due to a lack of „transparent and clearly 
defined procedures‟ regulating when a therapeutic abortion could lawfully be 
performed, as well as the threat of potential criminal sanctions under the provisions of 
the 1993 Pregnancy Termination Act.  Failure to comply with the conditions of the 
1993 Act could result in imprisonment up to three years.  It was noted by the ECtHR 
that the Polish government conceded that application of the 1993 Act was flawed.  
Among the difficulties hindering the implementation of the 1993 Act was the lack of 
guidelines to inform doctors about what constituted a threat to a woman‟s health or 
life that would justify a therapeutic abortion.  Neither were there any procedures in 
place whereby an independent and competent body would hear the pregnant woman‟s 
case for abortion and subsequently issue a timely decision. Furthermore, there was no 
mechanism in place to deal with any disputes between the pregnant woman and 
doctors, or even between the doctors, in the event of any disagreement about the 
suitability of a therapeutic abortion.  The ECtHR ruled that the absence of such a 
procedural and regulatory framework was in breach of Article 8 of the ECHR, 
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therefore finding that Poland had failed to safeguard the applicant‟s right to respect 
for her private life. 
What this judgment makes clear is that States must clearly articulate the rules 
regulating access to lawful abortions, provide stringent guidelines as to the precise 
circumstances when women can lawfully have an abortion, and include a mechanism 
to deal with any appeals arising from decisions.  The outcome of this decision is 
certainly instructive when considering the ECtHR‟s more recent judgment concerning 
the right to access abortion services under the ECHR in A, B, C v. Ireland.
 77
   
 
 
6. A, B & C v. Ireland - The Facts 
 
This case was brought before the ECtHR by three applicants who claimed that their 
rights under Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR were violated by the extant laws 
restricting abortion in Ireland as they all had to travel to England to have an abortion.   
The first applicant, A, became pregnant for a fifth time. This pregnancy was 
unintended as she thought that her partner was infertile.  At the time of her pregnancy, 
she already had four children who were in foster care as a consequence of her 
suffering from alcoholism in the past.  The youngest child was disabled. A was 
unemployed, unmarried and living in poverty. Prior to becoming pregnant for the fifth 
time, she had been trying to regain custody of her four children as she had stayed 
sober for the preceding year.  A also had a history of suffering from depression during 
her earlier pregnancies, and was suffering again during the fifth pregnancy.  
Accordingly, A felt that continuing with the pregnancy would pose a risk to her 
health, with her potentially relapsing with post-natal depression and threatening her 
sobriety.  She also felt that such a relapse would then prevent her from regaining 
custody of her other four children. A had to raise money to allow her to travel to 
England to have an abortion at private clinic, which she did by way of borrowing 
money from a moneylender at a high interest rate.  Furthermore, she felt unable to 
inform anyone that she was going to England for an abortion so she did not notify the 
social workers.  She had to return to Ireland the day after her abortion as she had a 
contact visit with her youngest child.  The applicant was afraid to seek medical advice 
in Ireland. Upon her return the day after her abortion, the applicant suffered from 
severe bleeding and she had to be taken to hospital for a dilation and curettage.  She 
continued to experience serious medical problems including pain, nausea and 
bleeding for weeks after her abortion, however she did not seek further medical 
advice. Since the abortion, the applicant became pregnant again and gave birth to her 
fifth child. A still suffers from depression. She has regained custody of three of her 
five children; the other two children are still in care.  
The second applicant, B, also had an unplanned pregnancy. B had taken the 
“morning-after pill”. Two different doctors informed her that there was a serious risk 
of an ectopic pregnancy, which could not be diagnosed until 6-10 weeks of her 
pregnancy. B felt that she could not continue with the pregnancy at this stage of her 
life, as she would be unable to care for the child alone.  She decided to have an 
abortion but had to wait a number of weeks for the counselling centre based in Dublin 
to reopen after the Christmas period. This applicant also faced financial difficulties.  
She had to use a friend‟s credit card to book flights to England.  At the time of her 
travelling to England for the abortion, B had received confirmation that there was no 
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risk of an ectopic pregnancy before she travelled to England for an abortion.  She 
travelled to England on her own and did not list anyone as her next of kin, nor did she 
provide an Irish address as she did not want her family to find out she had an abortion.  
She was advised by the clinic to inform her doctor in Ireland that she had suffered 
from a miscarriage.  Two weeks after the abortion when she had returned to Ireland, B 
suffered medical complications, passing blood clots. She attended a clinic in Dublin 
that was affiliated with the English clinic where she had the abortion for treatment 
because she was uncertain as to whether she had a legal right to travel to England for 
an abortion.  
The third applicant, C, had suffered from cancer and had undergone 
chemotherapy for three years prior to becoming pregnant. Her cancer had gone into 
remission and she became pregnant, however she was unaware of the pregnancy until 
after she had undergone a series of tests for cancer.  She sought assurances that the 
cancer treatment would not interfere with the pregnancy, and also sought information 
as to whether her health or life was at risk. She was unable to find any medical 
professional in Ireland who was willing to provide her with this information or 
assurance; therefore she travelled to England for an abortion. She had to wait eight 
weeks for a surgical abortion because her pregnancy was at such an early stage and no 
clinic would perform a medical abortion, as she was a non-resident in England. The 
reason for this is that medical abortions require follow-up care.  Like the other two 
applicants, C, also developed complications as it transpired that her abortion was 
incomplete, resulting in prolonged bleeding and infection.  The third applicant did 
consult with her own doctor after her abortion, and there was no further reference to 
her no longer being pregnant. 
Both A and B argued that their rights under Article 8 of the Convention had 
been breached because they were unable to obtain an abortion in Ireland for „health 
and well-being reasons‟.78 The third applicant, C, also contended that the lack of 
abortion services in Ireland where her right to abortion was constitutionally protected 
to safeguard her right to life, was a violation of her rights under Article 8. 
 
 
7. The ECtHR Decision in A, B & C v. Ireland 
 
The ECtHR first had to consider whether the three applicants had exhausted available 
domestic remedies, as is necessary under Article 35 of the Convention. The ECtHR 
deemed all three applications to be admissible under Articles 8, 13 and 14 of the 
Convention even though none of the applicants had initiated legal proceedings before 
the domestic courts, as it held that it would not have been possible for A and B in 
particular to access an effective domestic remedy because abortion is not permissible 
in Ireland to safeguard a woman‟s health or well-being.79  The ECtHR rejected the 
argument put forward by both A and B that the fact they had to travel to England for 
an abortion, and that there were no adequate abortion after-care services available to 
them in Ireland, amounted to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention which 
provides protection against inhuman and degrading treatment. 
 
7.1. Violation of Rights Accruing under Article 8 of the ECHR 
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The ECtHR had to determine whether the national legal position on abortion 
constituted a violation of Article 8 in respect of each individual applicant‟s case.  The 
ECtHR did not accept the argument of both A and B that there was a violation of their 
rights under Article 8.  The ECtHR did acknowledge there had been a violation of C‟s 
rights as C was always eligible to obtain an abortion under the Irish Constitution on 
the grounds that there was a real and substantial risk to her right to life. C‟s right to a 
private and family life under Article 8 of the Convention was breached because of the 
absence of a legal framework regulating constitutionally permissible abortions in 
Ireland despite the Supreme Court ruling almost 20 years ago in the Attorney General 
v. X.  This is redolent of the ECtHR‟s decision in Tysiąc v. Poland, whereby it held 
that States have a positive obligation under the ECHR to uphold any rights that it 
already guarantees. 
Some commentators speculated that the ECtHR would significantly liberalise 
Ireland‟s abortion laws to include a right to abortion where necessary to protect a 
woman‟s health.80  These claims have since been proven to be unfounded as the 
ECtHR did not put forward any recommendations that Ireland must extend access to 
lawful abortions for grounds other than where there is a real and substantial risk to the 
mother‟s life.  What is clear from this judgment is the unwillingness of the ECtHR to 
declare that the ECHR contains an absolute right to abortion.  The ECtHR affirms that 
Article 8 does not provide for a right to abortion.
81
  Moreover, it is clearly not 
prepared to interfere with a State‟s margin of appreciation even where abortion is 
permissible in very limited circumstances.  It is unsurprising that the ECtHR took this 
approach, as it has consistently afforded States a wide margin of appreciation in cases 
dealing with issues such as abortion, which are deemed to be „morally and ethically 
sensitive‟, particularly where there is a clear absence of consensus among the 
contracting States.
82
  Certainly the ECtHR has been loath to intervene in such 
situations because of the potential ramifications that this could have on existing 
abortion laws within the Contracting States.
83
 
The ECtHR ruled in A, B & C v. Ireland that the implementation of Article 
40.3.3° of the Constitution is in breach of the ECHR as there is no „accessible and 
procedural framework‟ regulating when a woman can have a legal abortion in this 
jurisdiction.  The decision of the ECtHR recommending that Ireland introduce 
legislation to govern those situations where abortion is legally permissible cannot be 
described as radical or even controversial. It is consistent with its earlier decision in 
Tysiąc, insofar as it will uphold existing rights. The ECtHR effectively rubberstamps 
the status quo regarding the right to abortion in Ireland, and is international approval 
for the proposal for legislation to implement Article 40.3.3° and access to legal 
abortions in Ireland put forward by the Supreme Court in the Attorney General v. X in 
1992. 
 
7.2. Does this Judgment Extend the Right to Abortion in Ireland? 
 
Deeming that all three applications were admissible under Articles 8, 13 and 14 of the 
ECHR despite the fact that they had not exhausted the domestic legal remedies 
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available was not an indication that the ECtHR was in fact willing to declare that the 
ECHR requires an extension of the right to abortion for other grounds. Rather this was 
mere recognition by the ECtHR that it would have been impossible for A and B to 
access an effective domestic remedy given that abortion is not legal in Ireland to 
protect a woman‟s health or well-being,84 and as such the ECtHR was consistent in its 
approach to dealing with admissibility of any case brought under the ECHR.  
The majority did not find in favour of the other two applicants regarding their 
submission that there was a violation of their right to a private and family life because 
they were unable to have a lawful abortion in Ireland on the grounds of social and, or 
economic factors.  Six of the 17 judges disagreed with this finding and contended that 
A and B‟s right to respect to a private life had been breached as both applicants would 
have been able to obtain an abortion in the majority of Contracting States on health 
and well-being grounds.  In this instance, the dissenting judges were of the opinion 
that this „decisively narrows the margin of appreciation‟.85 
However, the ECtHR refrained from declaring that the Constitutional position 
regarding abortion must be changed to allow for a woman to have an abortion to 
protect her health or for socio-economic reasons, thus leaving the broad margin of 
appreciation afforded to States under the ECHR intact. Albeit that the ECtHR did 
accept that the applicants suffered a „significant psychological burden‟ by having to 
travel to another jurisdiction for an abortion,
86
 and that all women faced considerable 
financial burden in doing so,
87
 this was not deemed sufficient to constitute a breach of 
the women‟s rights under the Convention. The implication again being that the 
ECtHR is not willing to extend or liberalise abortion laws to include abortion for 
socio-economic reasons where this is precluded from the extant law of a State.  
 
7.3. Violation of the Right to Life of the Mother 
 
The ECtHR rejected the third applicant‟s claim that her right to life under Article 2 of 
the Convention had been breached as she was unable to procure an abortion in Ireland 
on the basis that her life was at risk because she failed to present evidence 
demonstrating that she was unable to exercise her constitutional right to travel abroad 
for an abortion, and also that her right to life was at risk because of complications 
suffered after the abortion.
88
  
 
7.4 Article 8 and the Question of When Life Begins 
 
In determining whether the first and second applicant‟s right to a private life under 
Article 8 was interfered with due to the prohibition on abortion for health and well 
being reasons, the Court does not address the issue of when the life of the unborn 
child begins other than noting that there is no agreement amongst those contracting 
States regarding this question.
89
  The Court provides thorough analysis of a State‟s 
margin of appreciation regarding the provision of abortion, while being cognisant of 
the restrictions that can be placed on a State‟s margin of appreciation in any cases 
concerning the rights contained under Article 8 of the Convention where there is an 
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extant consensus „amongst a substantial majority of the Contracting States of the 
Council of Europe‟ permitting abortion in addition to circumstances where there is a 
real and substantial risk to the mother‟s life. However, in this case the ECtHR accepts 
that such consensus would not justify restrictions being imposed on Ireland‟s margin 
of appreciation, primarily because there is a lack of common accord as to when the 
right to life actually begins.
90
  The Court does not address the question of when the 
life of the unborn commences, nor does it attempt to provide any clarification on this 
matter, and neither should it, as this question has not been raised by any of the three 
applicants. Even if it had been raised, it is unlikely that the ECtHR would have dealt 
with this question of when life begins as it categorically refused to do so in its earlier 
judgment in Vo v. France.  As noted in the joint partly dissenting judgments of Judges 
Rozakis, Tulkens, Fura, Hirvela, Malinverni and Poalelungi, the ECtHR is quite 
simple „not well equipped to deal effectively‟ with the question of when life begins. 
 
7.5. Is this Judgment an Extension of the Right to Abortion under the ECHR? 
 
The ECtHR again makes it very clear that there is no right to abortion under Article 8 
of the Convention.
91
  As to whether there has been a breach of the first and second 
applicants‟ right to have an abortion on the grounds of their health and well being, the 
ECtHR ruled that there was no breach of Article 8 as both applicants had the option to 
travel to another jurisdiction for an abortion on these grounds, and as they also had 
access to both information about abortion and abortion services, and to medical 
treatment before and after the abortion. The ECtHR also commented that Ireland had 
struck a fair balance between the constitutional rights of the unborn child and the 
rights afforded to the applicants under Article 8 of the Convention.
92
  What is 
apparent from this judgment is that the ECtHR is not prepared to declare that the 
Convention provides for an absolute right to abortion, nor is it willing to stipulate that 
where a limited right to abortion exists within a contracting State, that there should be 
a liberalisation of a right to abortion to circumstances beyond the risk to the mother‟s 
life to include protection of the mother‟s right to health and well being. 
Unsurprisingly it will actively ensure that where a contracting State has provided for a 
right to abortion, albeit in very limited circumstances, as in this case, that the State 
will not be able to avoid its obligations under both domestic law and the Convention.  
When determining the third applicant‟s claim that there was a breach of her 
rights under Article 8 of the Convention due to the absence of an effective procedure 
to assess whether she could have a lawful abortion, the ECtHR again reiterated that 
States do have a broad margin of appreciation to decide whether abortion is 
permissible. However, adopting a similar approach to its decision in Tysiąc v. 
Poland,
93
 the ECtHR stressed that in situations where abortion is allowed, the State 
must then ensure the effective implementation of an adequate legal framework for the 
purpose of safeguarding any right to a legal abortion.
94
 The ECtHR ruled that the 
„ordinary medical consultation process between a woman and her doctor‟ was 
insufficient for this purpose.
95
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The ECtHR came to a unanimous decision that there had been a violation of 
the third applicant‟s right under Article 8 of the Convention due to the failure to 
establish a legal framework to determine whether a woman qualified for a legal 
abortion in Ireland.  
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
The ECtHR‟s decision is conservative, though consistent with the earlier approach 
taken in Tysiąc v. Poland when it ruled that there had been a breach of the applicant‟s 
right to a private life under Article 8 of the Convention because Poland had failed to 
provide procedural and regulatory framework to determine disputes between the 
patient and medical specialists regarding access to abortion on therapeutic grounds.
96
 
The message emanating from both of these decisions is quite simply that if abortion is 
permissible within a State on certain grounds, then the State has a positive duty under 
the Convention to ensure that effective and appropriate access is available to those 
individuals who wish to exercise their rights under both domestic law and the 
Convention. 
The potential impact of the ECtHR judgment in A, B & C v. Ireland on Irish 
abortion law is that it should result in clarification of the extant laws regarding access 
to lawful abortions. This is more of a subtle change as opposed to a radical overhaul 
of the status quo. The most significant implication of this ruling is that it will be 
increasingly impossible for the Irish government to continue to evade its 
responsibility to introduce legislation containing guidelines governing the provision 
of lawful abortions.  Certainly Ireland could ignore this ruling, given that the 
Convention is sub-constitutional.  However, the potential political ramifications of 
failing to do so are that it could jeopardise Ireland‟s membership of the Council of 
Europe. Thus far, Ireland has been a good citizen in terms of complying with previous 
rulings from the ECtHR.
97
  Regulating the existing position regarding the right to a 
lawful abortion where the mother‟s life is at risk would be less controversial than the 
alternative, that alternative being a Constitutional referendum on whether to liberalise 
the right to abortion to include health and well being, or indeed socio-economic 
grounds.  
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